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On January 25th, 2011 thousands of pro-
testers took to the streets of major cities 
in Egypt—referred to as the “day of 
wrath”—to express their grievances and 
frustration with the ruling regime, ulti-
mately leading to the ouster of President 
Hosni Mubarak after three decades in 
power. The street, as a socially construct-
ed space of discontent, had become the 
central locus of political change. In this 
paper, I will tackle the question of how 
and why policing strategies in Cairo failed 
to contain protesters, eventually leading 
to the withdrawal of security forces on 
January 28th. I will analyze the interac-
tions between security forces and protest-
ers in protest events during the uprising, 
focusing on policing strategies, tactical 
repertoires, and spaces of resistance. 
Through this, I hope to offer a way of 
looking at the politics of territorialization 
and space production in protest, and by 
extension, the negotiation of power rela-
tions between authority and resistance 
actors.
Keywords: Protest; Space; Egypt; Tactical 
Repertoires; Protest Policing; Arab Upris-
ings; Cairo.
Introduction
Under an authoritarian regime there is no 
transparent, legitimate set of state institu-
tions through which a citizenry can ex-
press demands and discontent. As soci-
ologist Asef Bayat remarks, however, when 
people are deprived of the electoral pow-
er to change the status quo, they “are like-
ly to bring collective pressure to bear on 
authorities to undertake change” (11). This 
is particularly evident in the case of Egypt. 
When thousands of Egyptians took to the 
streets of Cairo and other cities in the 
country to contest then-President Hosni 
Mubarak’s authoritarian rule, the country’s 
security forces were overwhelmed not 
only by the sheer number of protesters, 
but arguably also by their tactics in appro-
priating and maintaining spaces of resis-
tance.
In this paper, I will shed light on the protest 
policing of what has come to be known as 
the “January 25 uprising” in Cairo. Ground-
ed in a sociology of space and social 
movement research, this paper assumes 
that the negotiation of power relations 
during the uprising was expressed in at-
tempts by protesters to gain territorial 
control through tactical repertoires in or-
der to produce and expand spaces of re-
sistance; whereas the security forces at-
tempted to maintain territoriality through 
policing strategies to control and contain 
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these spaces. The data for this endeavor 
consists in participant observation, semi-
structured interviews, and qualitative doc-
umentary analysis.
This paper is structured as follows: first, I 
will conceptualize notions of tactical rep-
ertoires and policing strategies in social 
movement research, before elaborating 
on the relationship between social space, 
territoriality and tactics in protest. What 
follows is a case study of key events1 dur-
ing the January 25 uprising, in which I seek 
to relate the theoretical considerations, 
mentioned above, to my ethnographic 
findings. Through this, I hope to offer a 
way of looking at the politics of territorial-
ization and space production in protest, 
and by extension, the negotiation of pow-
er relations between authority and resis-
tance actors.
Tactical Repertoires and Policing Strate-
gies
Tactical repertoires, or simply tactics, are 
at the heart of any protest action. They em-
body the means for gaining territorial con-
trol over places and expanding or contain-
ing spaces of resistance. As Taylor and Van 
Dyke note, tactical repertoires are tools of 
“contestation in which bodies, symbols, 
identities, practices, and discourses are 
used to pursue or prevent changes in in-
stitutionalized power relations” (268 em-
phasis in original). They do not “just exist” 
in a vacuum, but operate within structural 
constraints, such as repression, or poverty 
of resources (Ennis 520).
As social movement research indicates 
(McAdam; Suh; Tilly), the development of 
tactical repertoires occurs over time within 
structural constraints—a process that I call 
political learning. As shown elsewhere 
(Abdelrahman; El-Mahdi and Korany; 
Soudias), Egypt’s January 25 uprising can 
be understood as the culminating epi-
sode of five contentious cycles since 2000. 
Each cycle included a predominant pro-
testing actor, ranging from pro-democra-
cy actors to the labor movement, which 
introduced particular tactics from which 
other (involved) actors were able to learn. 
Here, actors implement those known and 
available tactics that—through individual 
and collective experiences and observa-
tion of other actors’ experiences—have 
proven to be successful in order to pursue 
a goal. In this vein, Tilly rightly points out, 
“the existing repertoire constrains collec-
tive action […] people tend to act within 
known limits, to innovate at the margins of 
the existing forms, and to miss many op-
portunities available to them in principle” 
(390).
This is true also for the tactics of security 
forces. In social movement research, these 
can broadly be subsumed under the label 
of policing strategies. Della Porta and Re-
iter (33) found out three strategic ap-
proaches for policing protest events: co-
ercive strategies (use of force, violent 
means, or agents provocateurs to control 
or disperse a protest action in a legal or 
illegal manner), persuasive strategies (at-
tempt to control protest through contact-
ing activists, organizers and leaders prior 
to protest event), and informative strate-
gies (gathering widespread information 
about an event and targeted information 
to identify law-breakers). Throughout the 
January 25 uprising, coercive strategies 
were dominant. As one protester notes, 
“the state security has an […] automatic 
program to counter protests” (protest par-
ticipant, personal communication, 23 Mar. 
2011). The main goal of policing is territo-
rial control and will be discussed in detail 
below. As I will show, Egyptian security 
forces regularly resort to coercive strate-
gies in order to suppress dissidents. As far 
as mobilization is concerned, coercive po-
licing strategies may increase the risk of 
collective action and make it less attractive 
for bystanders to join, thus constraining 
mobilization. However, it is important to 
note that coercive policing strategies can 
very well backlash and lead to increased 
mobilization. As della Porta and Diani 
note,
[…] many forms of repression, particu-
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larly when they are considered illegiti-
mate, could create a sense of injustice 
that increases the perceived risk of in-
action. It is not surprising therefore that 
these two divergent pressures produ-
ce contradictory results, and empirical 
research indicates a radicalization of 
those groups most exposed to police 
violence in some cases and renunciati-
on of unconventional forms of action in 
others. (200)
As I will illustrate, protesters still widely 
feared the state’s repressive power, pre-
dominantly expressed through coercive 
policing. However, with protesters taking 
over more and more streets during the up-
rising, protesters’ perception shifted as 
the perceived strength of the movement 
increasingly outweighed the fear of state 
repression (Kurzman).
Territoriality and Spaces of Resistance
Tactical repertoires and policing strategies 
are the means of gaining territorial con-
trol, and for protesters they are the prereq-
uisite for constructing spaces of resis-
tance. I concentrate on Henry Lefebvre’s 
notion of spaces as it underlines that the 
social and the spatial are inseparably 
linked and mutually constitutive.2 
In Lefebvre’s conception, spaces are con-
structed through social relations and 
structures. Acknowledging that spaces are 
experienced in multiple ways, Lefebvre 
(33; 38-39; 245) identifies the triad of per-
ceived space (spatial practice), conceived 
space (representations of space), and 
lived space (representational spaces); see-
ing a unity between physical, mental, and 
social space. An example that incorpo-
rates these constructs is Tahrir Square in 
the heart of Cairo. The Square has been 
conceived, designed and produced 
through labor, technology and institutions. 
The meaning of the space, however, is 
adapted and transformed as it is per-
ceived and lived by social actors. Tahrir 
Square, which had been conceived as a 
traffic junction, may have been perceived 
as a central and popular meeting spot, 
and lived as a hub of transportation, con-
sumption and socializing on January 24, 
2011. But on January 25, 2011, when the 
Egyptian uprising began, it has widely 
been perceived as a space of protesting 
authority and lived as a heterotopia of re-
sistance despite its initial conception 
(Schumann and Soudias; Telmissany).
Tactical repertoires, then, are a means for 
inducing and maintaining such a transfor-
mation. As people use Tahrir Square in a 
way other than its initial conception as a 
traffic junction, it can become something 
else entirely, appropriated in use. This is 
true for various streets, squares and build-
ings during the January 25 uprising, 
where their “orderly”3 use changed to-
wards an “exceptional” appropriation with 
shifting actions, symbols, and discourses 
that can be subsumed under the banner 
of resistance.
This experience is not unique to Cairo, but 
occurred in similar ways in the squares of 
Taksim, Syntagma, Euromaidan, Puerta del 
Sol, or Tagheer—to name just a few occu-
pations around that time. But why do pro-
testers take their demands to city centers? 
Building on Bayat (167-69), I argue that 
protesters chose to take their dissent to 
downtown Cairo for a variety of interre-
lated reasons: (1) mobile crowds can rap-
idly assemble and disperse at large streets 
and squares, such as Qasr al-Aini Street 
and Tahrir Square; (2) downtown Cairo has 
historical and political significance as most 
political institutions are located there 
(symbolizing state-power) and major his-
torical uprisings have occurred in the area 
(1881 Urabi revolt at Abdeen Square; 1919 
Anti-British uprisings, where women pro-
tested alongside men for the first time;4 
1977 bread riots at Tahrir Square); (3) 
downtown Cairo serves as the intersection 
for mass transportation networks, facilitat-
ing easier access and escape for potential 
protesters; (4) downtown Cairo is the cen-
ter of media attention, which allows pro-
testers to extend their discontent beyond 
their immediate environment.
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In line with my argument, security forces 
attempted to prohibit this change, that is, 
the construction of spaces of resistance, 
through territorialization in order to main-
tain public order. As Herbert notes, 
Territorial control is an inherent out-
come of the social organization of the 
police [...] modern policing has meant 
the development of a capacity to intru-
de into and control space. […] officers 
can, when necessary, secure control of 
the flow of action in space. The police 
[…] are expected to be effective agents 
of territoriality, to be able to control so-
cial action by controlling area. (6-10)
Many policing strategies involve enacting 
boundaries, restricting access and using 
force in creating and maintaining “public 
order.” As Sack notes, “social power can-
not exist without these territorial rules. 
Territorial and social rules are mutually 
constitutive” (327). Complementing Fou-
cault’s notion of disciplinary power, the 
capacity to use force is central to the role 
of the police. The nation state needs the 
capacity to exercise systematic control 
over its population in order to maintain 
itself. In Egypt, this has been reinforced 
with the Emergency Law. In place since 
President Sadat’s assassination in 1982 un-
til 2012, it allowed security forces to arrest 
people without charge, limit freedom of 
assembly and expression and effectively 
criminalize any kind of protest.5 In sum-
mary, the state’s authority and existence is 
dependent on “the capacity of the police 
to mark and enact meaningful boundar-
ies, to restrict people’s capacity to act by 
regulating their movements in space” 
(Herbert 13). Because state power is em-
bedded in a concrete territory and par-
ticular spatial routines, contention over 
space is a direct challenge to state control 
and authority (Zajko and Béland 721). This 
is especially true when strategic buildings 
with an immense political significance, 
such as the Ministry of Interior (MoI) that 
usually houses the police, are being be-
sieged or taken over.
As I will show in the following section, pro-
testers during the January 25 uprising 
were aware of the security forces’ coer-
cive policing strategies and carefully con-
sidered their tactics accordingly. By at-
tempting to gain territorial control of 
streets and squares, protesters targeted 
constructing, maintaining, and expanding 
spaces of resistance.
January 25: A Diary of Resistance6
With the fall of Tunisian President Ben Ali 
on January 14, 2011, hopes and worries for 
a similar revolutionary uprising for Egypt 
were widely discussed in Cairene cafés 
and elsewhere. Various blogs and Face-
book pages were quick to announce a ma-
jor protest event on January 25 with a cat-
alog of demands, ranging from minimum 
wage to ending the Emergency Law. 
Widely labeled as the “Day of Wrath,” the 
demonstration was scheduled to coincide 
with National Police Day to protest routine 
brutality and torture by the state security 
apparatus. On January 24, I contacted an 
activist with the April 6 Youth Movement 
to find out where the protest would be lo-
cated and he told me there was no spe-
cific location. He explained that the ab-
sence of protest locations was in part a 
strategic omission; hinting that protests 
were intended to be all over the country, 
predominantly in residential areas. I inter-
pret this as a tactical stance in countering 
territorial control by security forces. 
Whereas, previously, protests had taken 
place in locations symbolizing state pow-
er, such as in front of the cabinet building 
or the parliament, the January 25 protest 
was intended to mobilize people in resi-
dential neighborhoods. The security forc-
es would expect protests in the same old 
locations as occurred over the previous 
decade. But demonstrations scattered 
across the city would soon prove difficult 
to police.
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January 25: To New Beginnings
On the morning of January 25, downtown 
Cairo was practically deserted. A massive 
security presence in front of the MoI and 
on Tahrir Square was intended to intimi-
date potential protesters. Plainclothes 
state security agents urged passers-by to 
keep moving and not stand in the square—
attempting to preemptively disrupt pro-
test crowds from gathering and maintain-
ing “public order.” Around noon, a group 
of some 40 protesters approached the 
square from Qasr al-Aini Bridge, which 
leads to the square, but were immediate-
ly blocked by riot police. The individuals 
fled towards Corniche al-Nil (a wide street 
along the Nile), reassembled and 
marched away from Tahrir Square towards 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Within min-
utes they joined up with another group of 
a few hundred people who were already 
marching on Corniche al-Nil. Behind the 
marching crowd, a large group of riot po-
lice was keeping a constant distance. Only 
when the protesters attempted to ap-
proach Tahrir Square did the riot police 
violently intervene. 
By the time protesters arrived at the state 
TV building (Maspero), the group num-
bered in the thousands. As Maspero sym-
bolizes state-power, the demonstrators 
stopped there and chanted against the 
regime. Following this, the group attempt-
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ed to march to the heavily populated 
Shoubra neighborhood to link up with an-
other emergent protest group. The secu-
rity forces blocked off certain streets on 
the way, but the crowd would always 
avoid confrontations and continued to 
shift to more peripheral side streets, while 
remaining cohesive. As one respondent 
noted,
If you imagine the protesters were like 
a body of water, the police would not 
necessarily try to stop the water, be-
cause the water would break through. 
So what the police would do is channel 
the protesters. When I was in Shoubra 
[…] I would see the police block roads, 
but always keep one road open, so pro-
testers would keep flowing. Instead of 
trying to block them all […] the police 
would block the important routes. They 
would not want them to go to certain 
areas, but then they would open insi-
gnificant routes and try to keep them 
circled. (Protest participant, personal 
communication, 21 Mar. 2011)
The security forces were still following the 
crowd but did not crack down. This hesi-
tancy was surprising. Usually, as soon as 
protests emerge, the police would set up 
cordons and beat protesters down. But 
this day passers-by joined in, the protest-
ers physically expanded their space as 
they marched, and soon the demonstra-
tors outnumbered the surrounding secu-
rity forces. This appropriation amounts to 
a process of negotiating what is allowed 
and “orderly,” and what is not. While more 
research needs to be done as to why the 
police were so reluctant to use force, many 
of the participants I talked to interpret this 
initial hesitancy as a move by the regime 
to avoid the same mistakes of indiscrimi-
nate and brutal protest policing as Ben Ali 
in Tunisia.
After hours of marching, the demonstra-
tors arrived in Shoubra and were con-
fronted by a massive police cordon on 
Shoubra street. This time they confronted 
the blockade and some fighting erupted 
between police and protesters. The block-
ade opened due to the sheer number of 
protesters, and they were allowed to keep 
marching. The security forces were unable 
to contain the masses with their usual cor-
doning tactics. Arguably, the unprece-
dented experience of breaking through 
police cordons contributed to the protest-
ers’ perception that they, and by exten-
sion the protest movement, have grown 
stronger than the state’s capacity to re-
press dissent. 
The appropriation of space continued that 
day, as thousands gathered in front of the 
Supreme Court, the headquarters of the 
ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), 
Maspero and the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs and outside Cairo in Alexandria, Tan-
ta, Mansoura, Aswan and Asyut (“Egypt 
Warns Protesters”). While neither of the 
“organizing” movements explicitly and 
publicly called for it, at around 5 pm, thou-
sands marched into Tahrir Square. One 
respondent reported: 
Everybody knows: ‘When in doubt, go 
to Tahrir.’ […] I don‘t know if protesters 
organized it together to go to Tahrir or 
if they knew instinctively—because in 
2003 [anti-Iraq war protest] that was 
where everyone met up in the end. 
(Protest participant, personal commu-
nication, 17 Mar. 2011)
This underlines the political learning pro-
cess I outlined earlier. In this case, and in 
other interview situations, the protesters 
recalled the success of occupying Tahrir in 
the 2003 anti-war protest, and chose to as-
semble there again for January 25. Pro-
testers approached the square from differ-
ent directions, making it impossible for a 
significantly outnumbered security force 
to contain them. The protesters were able 
to converge in the square. The only street 
off Tahrir with an overwhelming security 
presence was Qasr al-Aini—the street near 
which many ministries as well as the parlia-
ment are situated. Qasr al-Aini was off lim-
its. When the protesters attempted to ap-
propriate this street, riot police responded 
with water hoses, massive amounts of tear-
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gas, and rocks thrown by what appeared 
to be paid thugs (baltagy). Protesters re-
sponded by breaking street pavement 
and hurling it at riot police. Whenever the 
protesters retreated, the battle would 
stop. This process of negotiating space 
lasted several hours. Later, additional riot 
police positioned themselves on all streets 
leading to Tahrir Square. Yet protesters 
were free to enter and exit. One protester 
on January 25 asked me to spread the 
word to stay at the square because the 
crackdown might occur at midnight, when 
the number of protesters had decreased, 
as had happened in the 2003 anti-war pro-
tests. This protester had learned from his 
experiences in 2003 that police might try 
to violently disperse the demonstration at 
night, after many of the protesters had left. 
Another protester reported:
Around 10:30 pm, I met a correspon-
dent for Al Jazeera and he told us they 
[police] are going to sweep it [Tahrir 
Square] around midnight. It was pretty 
known, even to media. We knew that 
they would attack us at 1:00 am and the 
objective was not to keep the [square]—
because of the amount of riot police 
we saw getting prepared outside. The 
objective was to get them on camera, 
beating […] us and firing at us. That was 
the actual objective. And an organizer 
[of the protest], […] came and told me: 
“Stay strong at 1:00 am. Make sure that 
you uphold it to the point they [police] 
get very violent, so we can get it on 
camera.” (Protest participant, personal 
communication, 17 Mar. 2011)
The security forces marched on the square 
around 3:00 am with massive force, ar-
resting hundreds, including the protester 
quoted above. The protesters had learned 
the police tactic from previous confronta-
tions, and applied the counter tactics they 
believed to be most suited for maintain-
ing their protest. Activists used the media 
as a platform for spreading their dissent 
beyond Tahrir Square, arguably by appro-
priating the space of news coverage, in 
order to attract other Egyptians to join 
and prompt an international response to 
police brutality. The MoI issued a state-
ment blaming the Muslim Brotherhood 
for initiating the protests, a claim the 
Brotherhood denied. This move was in-
tended to delegitimize the protests while 
legitimizing repressive policing; suggest-
ing the regime was only fighting the “Is-
lamist threat”. January 25 marked the be-
ginning of a seemingly horizontal 
uprising, in which protesters increasingly 
gained territorial control over Cairo’s 
streets and squares. 
January 26: New Situation, Old Policing 
Strategies
As policing did not manage to contain 
protesters, which is certainly related to the 
unusual hesitancy in cracking down on the 
appropriation of space by protesters, inte-
rior minister Habib al-‘Adly issued orders 
to “arrest any persons expressing their 
views illegally,” thus trying to legitimate 
coercive policing by a narrative of uphold-
ing ‘public order’ (“Timeline: Egypt’s Rev-
olution”). That day, with mobile communi-
cation cut off, I went to the journalists 
syndicate—then a stronghold of opposi-
tion to the regime—assuming protests 
would be staged there. As with previous 
protests at this location, protesters stood 
on the steps in front of the syndicate and 
were surrounded and contained by a po-
lice cordon twice their size. Some 80 pro-
testers chanted “leave, leave [Mubarak]” 
and “down, down, Hosni Mubarak.” The 
protests were more energetic and vocal 
than I had witnessed on other occasions. 
Thousands of riot policemen were on 
standby, spanning the entire distance 
from the Supreme Court’s main entrance 
to the lawyers and the journalists syndi-
cate, as hundreds of protesters ap-
proached the area and attempted to join 
the many small, scattered protests in the 
area. The protesters seemed angry, con-
fronting police by yelling, pushing, and at-
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tempting to break through the cordon. 
When they did, the riot police hit them 
with batons and plainclothes agents 
would drag some of them behind the cor-
don and severely beat them. Despite the 
presence of international reporters, often 
associated with police restraint, the police 
did not hesitate to beat protesters.7 After 
some hesitancy during January 25, the po-
licing strategies returned to the same co-
ercive and brutal ones the protesters were 
demonstrating against in the first place. 
The coercive policing that day was intend-
ed to reestablish the norms of what pro-
testers are and are not allowed to do.
A few meters away from the journalists 
syndicate, passers-by were stopping to 
watch and condemn the violent interac-
tions. In less than half an hour, some three 
dozen by-standers gathered and started 
chanting against police brutality. In re-
sponse, the police opened traffic on the 
street to disperse the bystanders and pro-
testers, who increasingly started to sur-
round the very police cordon surrounding 
the protesters on the steps of the journal-
ists syndicate. Opening traffic worked to 
an extent and the crowd scattered, but 
soon by-standers turned protesters start-
ed marching away from the police pres-
ence and further into downtown Cairo. 
As protests and marches were taking 
place all over town, the standard police 
tactic of cordoning became impossible. 
Instead, they reverted to chasing protest-
ers and beating them up. Yet the protest-
ers would reassemble and keep marching. 
I suggest that on January 26 the protesters 
continued to recognize and fear the state’s 
coercive powers but to a lesser extent 
than in the past. At this point, relative to 
the state security presence in and around 
downtown, they felt these powers were 
hardly comparable to the strength of the 
protest movement. The perceived strength 
of the movement became a decisive fac-
tor in people’s decision to participate 
(Kurzman).
January 28: Policing Breakdown
Protests continued on January 27 across 
several cities, including Cairo, Alexan-
dria, Suez and Ismailia, and hundreds 
were arrested. Yet by upholding spaces 
of resistance through their continuing 
engagement in street protests, protest-
ers made it clear that they would not 
give up until their demands were met. 
On January 28, Internet and mobile 
telephone services were entirely cut off. 
This tactic was intended to weaken 
demonstrations but it backfired instead: 
as the protesters were unable to com-
municate and coordinate protest loca-
tions, they were scattered all over Cairo, 
making it all the more difficult for the 
already weakened police to contain and 
cordon them.
For the first time since January 25, the 
Muslim Brotherhood announced it would 
“allow” individual members to participate 
in protests, but not join as an organiza-
tion. One protest participant recalled, “on 
the 28th, when we started from the 
mosque it was extremely apparent there 
were people of the Brotherhood that 
made a huge impact on the amount of 
people [protesting]” (protest participant, 
personal communication, 17 Mar. 2011). 
After Friday prayer in mosques, which 
had also been appropriated by protest-
ers, tens of thousands of people took to 
the Egyptian streets. The main places of 
contention in Cairo were the Sixth of Oc-
tober Bridge, Qasr al-Nil Bridge, Al-Azhar 
Mosque, the Presidential Palace and Tah-
rir Square. That day protesters set fire to 
the NDP headquarters. Setting this build-
ing on fire not only contributed to the 
protesters’ perception that power struc-
tures were negotiable, but went further 
and set a concrete example of abolishing 
authoritarian structures as the regime 
was slowly “burning down.” Not merely 
metaphorical, the burning down of the 
headquarters had concrete logistic and 
strategic consequences, as it disturbed 
the inner cohesion and organization of 
the regime.
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Downtown Cairo was filled with teargas. 
Residents who chose not to actively par-
ticipate in protests would throw supplies, 
such as water and vinegar against the 
clouds of teargas, from their balconies as 
an act of solidarity and sympathy. Some 
would even throw water from their win-
dows and balconies on police forces as a 
means of attacking them. To me, and as I 
assume to other participants, these efforts 
were extraordinarily touching emotionally, 
as they solidified affective bonds between 
protesters and helped them sustain their 
efforts in the battle over protest spaces. As 
Cairo’s streets were filled with masses of 
protesters, security forces retreated from 
most places in order to defend key minis-
tries and government buildings. As a re-
sult, the bridges leading to downtown 
Cairo were marked by a huge security 
presence. Qasr al-Nil Bridge, which leads 
to Tahrir Square, was a center of conflict 
on January 28. Thousands of protesters at-
tempted to cross the bridge while masses 
of riot policemen countered with water 
trucks and armored vehicles in an attempt 
to quell the (re-) appropriation of space by 
the protesters. One participant notes:
Protesters marched towards the poli-
ce with their arms up in the air, chan-
ting “peaceful, peaceful.” They really 
tried not to make it violent. These were 
peaceful protesters marching towards 
security services who were respon-
ding with violence; who were beating 
them, shooting with teargas [and] rub-
ber bullets at them. In the face of such 
provocation, the restraint on the site of 
the protesters was incredible. (Protest 
participant, personal communication, 
21 Mar. 2011)
The protesters chanting “peaceful” were 
negotiating the terms of their space ex-
pansion through discursive practices in a 
Foucauldian sense. The chant can also be 
understood as a moral exhortation to 
delegitimize police violence. Most com-
munication with security forces would take 
place through chants that reflected the 
protesters’ intentions and goals. Some 
chants even asked for the police to join 
them. Still, the police generally responded 
using massive force, making January 28 
the bloodiest day since protests started. 
The riot police attacked protesters with 
large-scale use of teargas and with water 
hoses. The protesters used trashcans and 
previously occupied police outposts as 
shields and barricades and some threw 
the teargas grenades back at the police. 
Policemen seemed unable to cope with 
the situation, as their trucks ran over other 
policemen, teargas was thrown into the 
Nile and some riot policemen threw tear-
gas grenades at protesters without con-
sidering the wind direction, effectively 
gassing themselves. After several hours of 
battle and ineffective policing, the security 
forces retreated and thousands of protest-
ers were able to march into Tahrir Square, 
starting an occupation that would last for 
weeks. As one participant noted,
I think that what January 28th really 
demonstrated […] was how comple-
tely rotten to the core the police state 
had become. […] Honestly, how hard 
should it be for a police state to hold a 
bridge? That should be one of the easi-
est tasks for a police state that is able to 
deploy hundreds of thousands of se-
curity personnel. Instead what you saw 
was the incompetence of their security 
forces, lack of coordination between 
them and their total unpreparedness 
for an […] outpouring of political dis-
content. (Protest participant, personal 
communication, 20 Mar. 2011)
Even in trying to perform the usual func-
tions of territorialization as a means of po-
licing areas through massive security de-
ployment and violent crackdowns, it 
became apparent that the police were un-
able to perform their fundamental tasks. 
The training most riot policemen had 
been given was simply not enough to 
cope with such massive protests and the 
coercive policing strategies that they used 
generally failed to suppress dissent.8 Ac-
cording to a journalist respondent who 
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was able to interview security forces, riot 
policemen were ordered to work 16 to 18 
hours a day beginning on January 25, 
which was likely detrimental to their per-
formance. The respondent further claimed 
that policemen were threatened with jail 
and sexualized torture by their supervi-
sors, if they refused to confront protesters 
(protest participant, personal communica-
tion, 21 Mar. 2011). When I was observing 
police movement in my apartment right 
across the MoI on January 27, I witnessed 
how police officers slapped lower-ranking 
riot policemen and hit them with their 
guns if they refused to return to the front-
lines of battle on the opposite side of the 
ministry.9 Additionally, scale and determi-
nation of the protests overwhelmed secu-
rity forces, forcing the police to surrender 
certain areas and congregate at perceived 
critical locations key to the regime’s sur-
vival. After Tahrir Square, university cam-
puses, the bridges leading into downtown 
Cairo, and virtually all mosques that served 
as starting locations for protests had been 
“lost,” the police shifted their presence to 
the fortress-like MoI all the way up to near-
by Qasr al-Aini street, as well as to Mas-
pero. The regime would by no means al-
low these two buildings to “fall” as this 
could have severe implications for the 
protesters’ perception and fear of the re-
gime, but also the regime’s organizational 
performance. Clearly, losing control of 
these buildings could have induced a 
complete collapse of the regime. The MoI 
represents domestic state-power and 
houses the planning of police activity, 
while Maspero houses propagandistic 
state-broadcasting that reaches almost ev-
ery Egyptian household and represents 
the interface of communication and infor-
mation production, and distribution. It be-
came apparent that the protesters’ appro-
priation of spaces put the regime’s 
survival at stake as the streets slowly 
changed ownership.
A curfew starting at 6 pm was announced 
on January 28 to intimidate protesters and 
keep them off the streets. Yet thousands 
defied it and some attempted to approach 
the parliamentary assembly and the MoI, 
turning adjoining Qasr al-Aini street into a 
battlefield. The protesters set cars on fire, 
which then served as burning barricades 
against the police, and hundreds of pro-
testers continuously advanced towards 
the parliament equipped with sticks and 
stones. Pick-up trucks transported desks, 
chairs and wood laths to the front line to 
sustain the barricades, while cars and mo-
peds transported the wounded from the 
front lines to hospitals. Different protesters 
had different tasks ranging from physical 
fighting to efficient supply chain manage-
ment. The usual coercive police tactics of 
throwing teargas, beating with batons and 
shooting rubber bullets could not stop the 
protesters from expanding their space of 
protest to the parliamentary assembly.10 
Protester numbers, tactical considerations 
and implementation, as well as their per-
ception of state-power compared to their 
own were superior to the police’s. After 
hours of fighting, hundreds wounded and 
some killed, the protesters were able to 
appropriate the area around the parlia-
mentary assembly and Qasr al-Aini street, 
and forced the police to retreat to the MoI. 
Although it was heavily contested, protest-
ers did not manage to occupy the prem-
ises of the MoI as police were prepared to 
use lethal means in order to defend their 
“last frontier.” Yet the act of besieging the 
MoI, had a considerable impact on the or-
ganization and internal cohesion of the 
police. The next day, after severe and 
bloody fighting, riot gear and many police 
uniforms were found in the streets sur-
rounding the ministry, as policemen re-
portedly changed into plainclothes and 
fled the scene. Since the police had been 
unable to control territory, contain protest-
ers, or even keep its own men in line, mili-
tary forces took over on late January 28, 
after which the police virtually disap-
peared from the streets. The police’s with-
drawal facilitated the occupation of Tahrir 
Square, which quickly became the sym-
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bolic epicenter and a heterotopia of the 
Egyptian uprising (Schumann and Soudi-
as; Telmissany). The streets at that time, it 
appears, no longer belonged to the coun-
try’s autocrats, but to the people.
Conclusion
During the January 25 uprising in Cairo, 
protesters constituted spaces of resis-
tance and expanded them through the 
employment of tactical repertoires. The 
security forces on the other hand attempt-
ed to maintain control over spaces 
through policing strategies, trying to keep 
the streets contained and “orderly.” The 
struggle over protest spaces is a key ex-
pression of the negotiation of extant pow-
er structures between protesters, on the 
one hand, and the regime represented by 
their security forces, on the other. 
The battle over spaces by these actors un-
derlies strategies of spatial control. A 
premise of the modern nation state is its 
control over territory. The police are given 
a set of legal and coercive powers to im-
plement this control in terms of Foucauld-
ian disciplinary power. This is an inherent 
outcome of the social organization of the 
police as modern policing has meant the 
development of a capacity to intrude into 
and control space. Social power hence 
does not exist without territorial rules. The 
protesters’ attempt to constitute spaces of 
resistance is an act of a) resisting dictated 
modes of territoriality, and hence b) rene-
gotiating existing power structures by “lib-
erating” places, redefining symbols and 
meanings, expressing demands, grievanc-
es and desires.
In my case study, the capacity of the police 
to mark and enact meaningful boundaries, 
to restrict people’s capacity to act by regu-
lating their movements in space has prov-
en insufficient and jeopardized existing 
power relations in favor of the protesters. 
The police were not only unable to contain 
protesters, but barely managed to defend 
key state institutions. The latter in turn se-
verely restricted the regime’s capacity to 
organize and act, which temporarily led to 
the breakdown of state security services 
and their monopoly of force.
As suggested here, the modes of thinking 
the concepts of territorialization,space 
production, and tactical repertoires to-
gether can serve as a helpful analytical 
looking glass well beyond Egypt’s January 
25 uprising. To name just one example: 
following the coup d’état against Mursi in 
2013; the occupation of Raba’a al-Adawiya 
Square by Mursi-supporters; the rallies in 
Tahrir Square by his opponents, as well as 
supporters of the armed forces; and the 
establishment of “The Third Square” on 
Sphinx Square were an embodiment of 
power relations at that time.
This too is the case outside of Cairo, in the 
occupations of major squares, parks, and 
streets like in Athens, Istanbul, Madrid, 
New York, or Sanaa. These are all cases in 
point for how protesters produce spaces 
of resistance in order to challenge extant 
power relations. The coercive policing 
strategies through which security forces in 
each of these occupations cracked down 
on protesters not only show their attempts 
at social control through territoriality. They 
also show that when the status quo is seri-
ously under threat and authorities in jeop-
ardy, violence appears to be the primary 
policing choice — regardless whether the 
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2 For a review of space 
conceptions and their 
relation to protest, see 
Soudias 28-44.
3 According to the United 
States Institute of Peace, 
public order describes the 
“absence of widespread 
criminal and political 
violence, such as riots and 
intimidation against targeted 
groups or individuals” (73). 
One needs to keep in mind 
the problematic nature of 
the constitution of the term: 
The police are the agent 
of enforcing public order. 
As they usually hold the 
monopoly of the ‘legitimate’ 
use of force, they too can 
exert massive amounts of 
violence, therefore disrupting 
what is considered ‘public 
order’. I need to stress the 
very political, rather than 
normative connotation of the 
term as it is the authorities 
who usually decide upon 
the definition of order and 
disorder.
4 For a gender-focused 
perspective on the Egyptian 
revolutionary process, see 
Amar; al-Ali; Sholkamy.
Notes
1 A detailed ethnography of 
the entirety of the uprising 
is impossible, and due to 
lack of space, I will focus 
on those protest events in 
which I have participated 
in, and that provide fruitful 
examples of police-protester 
interactions in relation to my 
argument. Data has been 
gathered through participant 
observation throughout 
the 18 days, qualitative 
documentary research, 
as well as semi-structured 
interviews in March and 
April 2011 with participants, 
i.e. self-described first-
time protesters, activists, 
and journalists. During my 
participation in the January 
25 uprising, I framed my 
role as a researcher, but 
strongly sympathized with 
the protesters’ cause and 
even became friends with 
many of the people I have 
met during the uprising or 
while conducting interviews. 
Albeit I did not participate 
in chants and direct action 
against police, I too was part 
of the research situation: I 
too marched and maintained 
solidarity with protesters in 
the face of continuous police 
attacks. Whether or not I was 
successful in maintaining 
critical distance to my 
research subject, I leave up to 
the reader to decide.
5 Though the emergency 
law in Egypt was formally 
suspended in 2012, a new 
protest law introduced in 
late 2013 perpetuates the 
widespread criminalization of 
protest. 
6 Where not marked 
differently, the following 
is based on personal 
observations in protest 
events in Cairo between 
January 25 and February 11 
2011.
7 Multiple respondents noted 
that journalists, particularly 
international reporters, 
have a restraining effect on 
violent policing, as regime 
and security forces have no 
interest in police brutality 
being reported abroad.
8 For more detailed 
information regarding the 
organization of security 
forces in Egypt prior to the 
January 25 uprising, see 
Soudias 61-65.
9 These observations indicate 
struggles within the security 
force during that time. While 
further research is required, 
it is fair to say the police did 
not act and function as a 
monolithic unit during these 
18 days.
10 Unverified sources even 
reported police use of live 
ammunition on Qasr al-Aini. 
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